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Abstract
The recent development of vehicular networking technologies brings the promise of improved driving safety and
traffic efficiency. Cooperative communication is recognized as a low-complexity solution for enhancing both the
reliability and the throughput of vehicular networks. However, due to the openness of wireless medium, the vehicular
wireless communications (VWC) is also vulnerable to potential eavesdropping attacks. To tackle with this issue, we in
this paper propose a novel user-cooperation scheme with anti-eavesdropping capabilities. Specifically, prior to any
frame transmission, a source-relay pair is jointly selected to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. After that, the
selected relay assists the source to deliver its data to the destination. The proposed selection scheme can be realized
in a fully distributed manner, and the security is guaranteed without using any encryption techniques at the upper
layers. The closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability and the intercept probability are derived, and
the achievable diversity order is also analyzed. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms the
competing counterparts in terms of both the secrecy outage probability and the average secrecy rate.
Keywords: Vehicular relaying networks; Cooperative communications; Physical layer security; Source-relay selection;
Distributed implementation
1 Introduction
During the past few years, vehicular networks have
received increasing attentions due to their potentials in
enhancing road safety, improving traffic efficiency, and
providing mobile infotainment services [1]. In vehicular
networks, the information exchange among the vehicles
can be typically performed in two modes, namely, vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I). The
V2V communications do not rely on the existence of
the central unit, and the vehicles can communicate with
each other directly via either single-hop or multi-hop con-
nections. Comparably, in V2I communications, data is
transferred between the vehicle and the fixed infrastruc-
ture deployed along the roadside, which is often called the
roadside unit (RSU) in the literature. The co-existence of
these two modes makes the vehicular networks a hybrid
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network that supports both the infrastructure-based and
ad hoc communications.
The interests in vehicular networking dates back to
late 1980s. Since then, the idea of leveraging wireless
technologies for vehicular communications has fascinated
researchers around the globe, and great efforts have been
made to develop new architectures, protocols, algorithms,
and applications for vehicular networks. Many govern-
mental projects or plans have been set up to explore the
potentials of vehicular wireless communications (VWC),
including the VSC and VII in United States, the eSafety
in Europe, and the ASV series in Japan [2]. From the
industrial perspective, several standards have been cre-
ated, among which the most important ones are the IEEE
802.11p and IEEE 1609 protocol suites. IEEE 802.11p
specifies the physical layer (PHY) and medium access
control (MAC) layer features such that the existing IEEE
802.11 can work in vehicular environments, and IEEE
1609 mainly deals with the multi-channel operation, rout-
ing, and security issues. The academic research in the field
of VWC is also fruitful, ranging from the modeling of
© 2014 Sun et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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vehicular channels [3] to the development of MAC and
routing algorithms [4-7]. Besides that, some field trials
have also been carried out in many countries for objective
performance evaluation [8].
So far, simple and basic solutions at almost all layers
have been devised for vehicular communications. How-
ever, the unique features of vehicular networks make the
design of efficient VWC protocols challenging. First, the
vehicular networks are expected to support the mixture of
both the realtime and non-realtime services. As a result,
it is difficult to satisfy the diverse quality-of-service (QoS)
requirements by simply adopting the existing techniques.
Second, the fast movement of the vehicles makes the net-
work topology and the vehicle density highly dynamic, and
hence, the connectivity among the vehicles is hard to be
guaranteed. Third, due to the existence of various obsta-
cles along the roads, the propagation conditions for VWC
is harsher than those for general mobile ad hoc networks.
All these factors indicate the necessity for developing
innovative wireless techniques to support the emerging
applications in vehicular networks.
Among many candidates of VWC technologies, coop-
erative communication is widely regarded as a promising
solution to enhance the performance of vehicular net-
works from various layers. The key idea of cooperative
communication is to let the neighboring terminals relay
information for each other. In this way, the spatial diver-
sity gain as well as the spatial multiplexing gain can be
harvested without the deployment of multiple antennas.
The research in cooperative communications is pioneered
by Sendonaris et al. [9]. In [10], several basic cooperative
relaying protocols were proposed, and their outage per-
formances were analyzed. Since these two seminal papers,
a large body of literature has been devoted to the design,
analysis, and implementation of cooperative schemes for
various scenarios. In [11], the authors proposed a con-
stellation reassignment scheme at the relay to minimize
the symbol error rate at the destination node. In [12],
a link adaptive regeneration strategy was developed for
decode-and-forward (DF) systems. These works, however,
are concerned about the simple scenario where there is
only one source and one relay. For multiple-relay systems,
advanced relaying mechanisms such as distributed space-
time coding [13], relay selection [14], network coding
[15], and collaborative beamforming [16] were investi-
gated to further benefit the cooperative systems. Based on
the work in [14], the joint source-relay selection schemes
were proposed in [17,18] for multi-source multi-relay net-
works to exploit both the cooperative diversity and the
multi-user diversity.
In vehicular networks, there are often a large number
of vehicles that can serve as relays to facilitate both the
V2V and V2I communications. Therefore, the application
of cooperative relaying in vehicular communications is a
natural choice. In [19], a dual-hop inter-vehicular trans-
mission with relay selection was considered, and the out-
age performance as well as the achievable diversity order
was analyzed. By incorporating a highway mobility model,
the authors in [20] proposed a scheme for locating and
selecting the optimal relay station for multi-hop vehicu-
lar networks. While [19] and [20] mainly focused on the
PHY-layer issues, [5] dealt with the relay-aided MAC pro-
tocol design for vehicular communications. Specifically,
by adaptively choosing the relay node and the coopera-
tive mode, the proposed protocol can optimize the system
throughput and extend the service range. In [21], the
cross-layer routing was studied using cooperative relaying
technique. Through investigations, the authors pointed
out that cooperative transmission can yield more efficient
routes than the competing counterparts in terms of both
the reliability and the energy consumption. To fully char-
acterize the performance of vehicular relay networks, [22]
developed an analytical model and analyzed the access
probability and the connectivity probability.
Although there are plenty of schemes proposed so far
to take full advantages of cooperative communications
to improve the link reliability, increase the achievable
throughput, extend the service coverage, and lower the
energy consumption, very few works address the security
issue for relay-aided vehicular networks, which is also of
vital importance due to the openness of wireless chan-
nels. Consider a vehicular network consisting of multiple
source nodes, multiple relay nodes, and one destination
node. The relays can help the sources to deliver their mes-
sages to the destination. However, these messages can also
be overheard by some eavesdropper nearby the destina-
tion. Therefore, the developed relaying protocols should
provide the anti-eavesdropping capabilities. Traditional
approaches to securing communications rely heavily on
the data encryption at the upper layers of the protocol
stack. However, since data security is critically important,
it is reasonable to incorporate the security measures at all
layers, including the physical layer. Since the seminal work
of [23] and [24], more and more attentions have been paid
to PHY security from an information-theoretic point of
view [25-27].
Recently, the secrecy problem in cooperative communi-
cations networks has emerged as a hot research topic. In
[28], three cooperative schemes, namely, DF, amplify-and-
forward (AF), and cooperative jamming (CJ), are utilized
to secure the source-destination communications. By allo-
cating transmit power at the source and relays and deter-
mining the relay weights, the achievable secrecy rate is
maximized subject to the total power budget. PHY secu-
rity can also be realized via the appropriate selection of
relay nodes. Following the idea of jamming, the authors
in [29] proposed to select two relays to simultaneously
serve the legitimate user and confuse the eavesdropper.
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For the same system model, [30] also adopts the relay
selection and cooperative jamming to secure communica-
tions, but the jamming signal is sent from the destination
rather than the selected relay. In our previous work [31],
the security-embedded relay selection scheme is devised,
where the selected relay transmits the superposition of
the information-bearing signal and the artificial noise.
We have shown through rigorous analysis that full diver-
sity is achieved despite the existence of the eavesdrop-
per. Although the injection of artificial noise is useful in
improving the system security level, it also causes addi-
tional energy consumption. Aiming at this problem, [32]
presents the AF- and DF-based optimal relay selection to
maximize the secrecy rate, without using artificial noise.
Common to the works [28-32] is that they all assume that
there is only one eavesdropper within the considered area.
In comparison, [33] studied the relay selection issue for
dual-hop networks with multiple eavesdroppers.
Although the aforementioned works [28-33] have exhib-
ited the potentials of physical-layer techniques in securing
the wireless cooperative networks, all of them assumed
that there is only one node having message to trans-
mit. This assumption simplifies the protocol design and
the performance analysis, but may not be realistic for
vehicular networks. Different from these works, we in
this paper consider a more practical scenario where there
are multiple sources sharing the same pool of multi-
ple relays. For this scenario, a source-relay selection
strategy with anti-eavesdropping capabilities is proposed.
The selected source-relay pair is the one that offers
the maximum secrecy rate. A significant advantage of
the proposed scheme is that it can be implemented in
a distributed manner, which is attractive for vehicular
networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the system model and introduced the basic
assumptions. In Section 3, we give a detailed descrip-
tion of the proposed source-relay selection scheme. In
Section 4, we evaluate the system performance in terms
of the secrecy outage probability, the intercept probabil-
ity, and the achievable diversity order. Simulation results
are shown in Section 5, from which the superiority of our
scheme can be observed. Finally, we conclude our work in
Section 6.
2 Systemmodel
As is shown in Figure 1, we consider a V2I communica-
tions scenario where K vehicles (source nodes) want to
deliver their confidential messages to the RSU (the desti-
nation), which is located beyond the transmission range
of the vehicles, and thus, the direct links between the
sources and the destination do not exist. However, there
are M trusted vehicles that do not have message to trans-
mit and can serve as relay nodes to help the sources.
Meanwhile, near the destination, there exists a malicious
node (eavesdropper) that tries to intercept the informa-
tion intended for the destination. The sources, the relays,
the destination, and the eavesdropper are denoted by
Sk , (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), Rm, (m = 1, 2, . . . ,M), D, and E,
respectively. It is noted thatK ≥ 1, i.e., there might be sev-
eral sources having data to transmit at any time instant.
To avoid the inter-vehicle interferences and reduce the
implementation complexity, we employ a TDMA-based
scheduler which selects a single source-relay pair to access
the channel during one scheduling unit (the selection cri-
terion will be given in the next section). To facilitate the
presentations, we denote the selected source and selected
relay as Sk∗ and Rm∗ , respectively. After the scheduling is
completed, the transmission is carried out in a two-phase
manner. Specifically, Sk∗ transmits its data to Rm∗ in the
first phase, and Rm∗ re-transmits the received signal to D
using standard AF protocol [10] in the second phase. The
destination as well as the eavesdropper can hear the trans-
mission from Rm∗ and will perform decoding at the end
of the second phase. Here, we assume that the first phase
is secure and the information leakage only occurs dur-
ing the second phase, which is attributed to the fact the
the eavesdropper is near the destination and outside the
transmission range of the first hop. It is further assumed
that the channel state information (CSI) pertaining to
the eavesdropper’s channels is available at the legitimate
nodes. This assumption is commonly adopted in the PHY-
security literature such as [26], [28], and [32], and can be
satisfied in cases where the eavesdropper is active and its
transmission can be monitored.
Each node is equipped with a single antenna and oper-
ates in a half-duplex mode. All channels are assumed to
be independent and modeled as flat block fading, which
remain constant within one frame (a two-phase duration)
and vary independently from frame to frame. The chan-
nel coefficient between node i and node j is represented
by hij, which is a complex circularly symmetric Gaussian
variable with mean zero and variance μij. That is, hij ∼
CN(0,μij). The average transmit powers at the selected
source and the selected relay are denoted by PS and PR
respectively, and we assume PS = PR = P for simplicity.
The additive noise at each receiver is modeled as a com-
plex Gaussian variable with mean zero and variance N0.
The notation ρ = P/N0 is used to represent the average
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) of the system.
3 Distributed source-relay selection under
eavesdropping attacks
3.1 Selection criterion
As is mentioned above, a single source-relay pair is
selected for any frame transmission. According to the
principle of the AF protocol and the considered system
model, the kth (1 ≤ k ≤ K) source’s received SNR at the




















Figure 1 Systemmodel. K sources communicate with the destination via the help ofM relays.
destination, with the help of the mth (1 ≤ m ≤ M) relay,





1 + γskrm + γrmd
, (1)
where γskrm = P|hskrm |2/N0 and γrmd = P|hrmd|2/N0 are
the instantaneous received SNR at the mth relay from
the kth source and at the destination from the mth relay,
respectively.
Similarly, the received SNR at the eavesdropper can
be calculated as well by simply replacing γrmd in (1) by
γrme, where γrme = P|hrme|2/N0 is the instantaneous
SNR of the link Rm → D. Therefore, the instantaneous
secrecy rate, defined as the difference between the achiev-
able rate of the source-destination link and that of the









1 + γskrmγrme1 + γskrm + γrme
)]+
, (2)
where [x]+ = max(0, x). In order to minimize the secrecy
outage probability, defined as the probability that the
instantaneous secrecy rate falls below a target secrecy
rate, our criterion is to select such a source-relay pair
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With this criterion, the achievable secrecy outage prob-

























where RS represents the target secrecy rate, and v = 22RS .
Since RS is positive, v should be larger than 1.
If the global CSI is available at some node, e.g., the RSU,
the criterion in (3) can be implemented in a centralized
manner. However, it is non-trivial to obtain the CSI of
all the involved links, especially for the networks with a
large number of nodes. This motivates us to develop the
distributed algorithm with low complexity, the details of
which will be given in the next subsection.
3.2 Low-complexity distributed scheme
The proposed low-complexity design is based on the
observation of (3), which tells us that the achievable
secrecy rate is determined by γ (k
∗,m∗)
e2e , the maximum of
K × M γ (k,m)e2e ’s. According to the selection criterion in
Sect. III. A, γ (k
∗,m∗)
e2e can also be viewed as γ
(k∗,m∗)
e2e =




1 + γsk rmγrmd1+γsk rm+γrmd
1 + γsk rmγrme1+γsk rm+γrme
⎫⎬
⎭ (5)
With the above observation in mind, we can divide the
overall selection procedure into three steps. First, every
Sun et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2014, 2014:109 Page 5 of 11
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/109
relay node independently evaluates its eligibility for coop-
eration. After that, each eligible relay selects an appropri-
ate source to maximize its contribution to the achievable
secrecy rate. In this way, all the candidate source-relay
pairs are generated. Finally, a single pair with the maxi-
mum γ (k,m)e2e is screened out from the candidate pairs to
access the channel. The details of these steps are given in
the following:
• Step 1: Generating the Set of Eligible Relays. For any
relay node Rm, it can be deduced from (3) that if
γrmd < γrme, then γ
(k,m)
e2e will be less than 1, irrespec-
tive of the source index k. In other words, the system
will be in outage if this relay node is selected to access
the channel, no matter which source is chosen to form
the pair.
Further, when γrmd ≥ γrme, the secrecy outage




















× 1 + γsk∗ rm + γrme1 + γsk∗ rm + γrmd
< v
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where (a) stems from the fact that b+1a+1 <
b
a for a < b.













Therefore, the probability provided by (6) equals to 1,
implying that the outage event definitely occurs if we
choose such a relay to cooperate.
Summarizing the discussions above, we can conclude
that to support the target secrecy rate, the selected
relay has to satisfy the following condition:
γrmd > vγrme (7)
In other words, if the channel gains regarding Rm does
not meet (7), Rm cannot be selected. In steps 2 and 3,
we will only focus on the eligible relays satisfying (7).
It should be emphasized that the eligibility determina-
tion process requires the knowledge of γrmd and γrme
at Rm. However, this can be guaranteed because we
have assumed that both the RSU and the eavesdropper
are active entities which will transmit control informa-
tion or messages, and the corresponding channel gains
can be estimated at the relays using the pilots from the
received signals.
• Step 2: Source Selection at Eligible Relays. After step 1
has been finished, all the relays satisfying (7) broadcast
flag signals to declare its eligibility for cooperation.
Upon receiving the flag signals, all the sources will
send an ACK to respond. With the received ACKs,
any eligible relay Rm can estimate γskrm for all ks. After
that, Rm supposes itself to be the selected relay and
chooses the ‘best’ source which can contribute most
to γ (k,m)e2e . To elaborate on how to find such a source
node, a lemma will be introduced first.
Lemma 1. The function





where γ1 and γ2 are two constants with γ1 being larger
than γ2, is an increasing function of γ .
Proof. By taking the derivative of f (γ ) with respect
to γ , we can obtain
f ′(γ ) = (1 + γ1) (γ1 − γ2)
(1 + γ + γ1)2 (1 + γ2)
(9)
which is obviously larger than 0 for γ1 > γ2. There-
fore, f (γ ) is an increasing function of γ .
Based on this lemma, the ‘best’ source for Rm, i.e.,





1 + γsk rmγrmd1+γsk rm+γrmd






It is no doubted that step 2 also enjoys a distributed
implementation since the source selection is per-
formed at the eligible relays, and there is no informa-
tion exchange among different relay nodes.
• Step 3: Distributed Source-Relay Pair Selection. Upon
the completion of step 1 and step 2, we can formulate
the expression for the maximum achievable secrecy










To select the optimal source-relay pair, we adopt the
method based on the distributed timer [14]. Specifically,
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after calculating CmS , each eligible relay Rm will start
its timer with the initial value inversely proportional to
CmS . Therefore, the relay with the largest CmS , namely
Rm∗ , has its timer expired first. Rm∗ then broadcasts
the flag signal and the rest of the relays will back off
after receiving the flag signal. Noticing the fact that the
‘best’ source for Rm∗ has already been determined to
be Sk∗(m∗) in step 2, we now have the selected source-
relay pair.
Remark 1. The proposed source-relay selection scheme
has two advantages. First, it can be realized in a
distributed way, yielding a low implementation com-
plexity. This is of practical significance for vehicular
networks. Second, the distributed method, despite of
its simplicity, is an optimal solution in the sense that it
can select the ‘best’ source-relay pair to minimize the
system secrecy outage probability.
4 Performance analysis
4.1 Secrecy outage probability
The secrecy outage probability (SOP) is widely adopted as
a performance metric to evaluate the PHY-security proto-
col in wireless fading channels. As previously mentioned,
it is defined as the probability that the instantaneous
secrecy rate falls below a target secrecy rate RS > 0.
By noticing that the M γme2e’s are independent random

























Therefore, denoting γsk∗(m)rm , γrmd, and γrme by X, Y ,
































where fX(x) is the probability density function (PDF) of
the random variable X. The intractability of the PDF of
γme2e makes it rather difficult to calculate the accurate
result of the integral in the second part of (14). Therefore,
we resort to the approximation γ1γ21+γ1+γ2 ≈ min{γ1, γ2},
which is rather tight for large values of γ1 and γ2 [34].
Then, the second part of the right-hand side of (14),





[1 + min(X, y)










Pr [X < v(1 + z) − 1] fY (y)fZ(z)dydz
Combining (14) and (15), the approximate expression















Pr [X<v(1+z)−1] fY (y)fZ(z)dy dz
(16)
For the considered Rayleigh fading channels, γij follows
the exponential distribution with the rate parameter λij =(
ρμij











On the other hand, X = γsk∗(m)rm is the maximum of K
independently and non-identically distributed exponen-
tial random variables. According to the order statistics, I2





































× (λrmde−λrmdy) dy, (18)
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where we have utilized themultinomial expansion identity
given by [35], e.q. (7). After some tedious calculations, I2



































is obtained, and the SOP of
the system can also be derived by substituting this result
into (12). However, we omit these expressions here due
to space limitation. In the next section, we will show
through simulations that the derived theoretical result is
tight enough for medium to high SNR values.
4.2 Intercept probability
The intercept probability, which is also a key metric
in evaluating the performance of PHY-layer security
schemes, is defined as the probability that the capacity of
the legitimate link falls below that of the wiretap link [32].
















According to the expression for γme2e in (13), the event
γme2e < 1 is equivalent to
γrmd
γrme






















where X = γsk∗(m)rm ,Y = γrmd, and Z = γrme. The prob-
ability in the second integral in (22) can be rewritten as
Pr
[y(1 + X + z)
z(1 + X + y) < 1
]
= Pr [X(y−z)<z(1+y)−y(1+z)]
= Pr [X(y − z) < z − y]
(23)







fY (y)fZ(z)dydz = λrmd
λrmd + λrme
(24)
Combing (24) with (20), the exact expression for the








In order to gain some useful insights into the system per-
formance, we proceed to analyze the achievable diversity
order. Since the the intercept probability is not a function
of the average SNR, the traditional definition of diversity
order is not applicable here. Instead, we adopt the defini-
tion of generalized diversity order given in [32], which is
formulated as





where κde = μsd/μse is known as the main-to-
eavesdropper ratio (MER), defined as the ratio of the
average channel gain of the source-destination link to that
of the source-to-eavesdropper link.
To simplify the discussions, we assume that there is only
one source node. Denoting μrmd = μsdαrmd and μrme =




























where we have introduced αm to represent αrmdαrme .
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5 Simulation results and discussions
In this section, we present the simulation results to
validate the proposed source-relay selection scheme. In
the following simulations, all the nodes (including the
sources, the relays, the destination, and the eavesdropper)
are distributed in a 2-D plane. The direct links of Sk → D
and Sk → E are assumed to be absent for all k’s, and the
the channel gains are modeled according to the system





μij = d−θij with dij being the distance between any node
pair (i, j) and θ being the path loss exponent. In our simu-
lations, θ is fixed as 3. Unless otherwise stated, the target
secrecy rate RS is set to be 0.1 bit/s/Hz, and the notation
‘SNR’ is used to represent the ratio of P versus N0, i.e., ρ
in the previous sections.
In Figures 2 and 3, we consider the system with three
sources and two relays, i.e., K = 3 and M = 2. These
nodes are uniformly generated in the circle with center
(0,0) and radius 1. The destination and the eavesdropper
are located at (2,0) and (2,2), respectively. Figure 2 shows
the SOP-SNR curves for the proposed anti-eavesdropping
selection scheme and the conventional joint source-
relay selection scheme [17]. The theoretical result is
also given to verify the correctness of the analysis in
Section 4.1. From Figure 2, it can be seen that by tak-
ing the security constraints into account, the proposed
scheme brings non-negligible gains compared to the con-
ventional scheme, which only considers the channel qual-
ities regarding the legitimate links. In addition, there is
an excellent match between the theoretical curve and the
simulated one for medium to high SNR values, implying
the soundness of the theoretical analysis.
In Figure 3a, we compare the ergodic secrecy capacity
of the proposed scheme (C1) and that of the conventional
scheme (C2). To illustrate the capacity loss incurred by
the secrecy constraint, we calculate the ergodic capacity
for the system without eavesdroppers (C0) and present
the differences C0 − C1 and C0 − C2 in Figure 3ba. One
can observe from Figure 3a that the proposed scheme
outperforms the conventional scheme in terms of the
secrecy capacity. However, the secrecy capacities of both
the two schemes almost saturate as the SNR tends to
infinity. This is because that as SNR gets larger, the achiev-
able rate of the legitimate link as well as the eavesdrop-
per link increases. Comparably, without the existence of
the eavesdroppers, the system capacity increases linearly
with SNR, which is due to the multi-user diversity gain
[17]. This explains the phenomenon in Figure 3b, which
clearly reflects the capacity penalty to support the secrecy
constraints.
Figure 4 plots the system intercept probability as a func-
tion of the MER κde. In this figure, we assume K = 1
and fix SNR to be 20 dB. The source node and desti-
nation node are located at (0,0) and (2,0), respectively.
The location of the eavesdropper is determined according
to the value of κde. Other simulation parameters are the
























simulation results for the proposed scheme
theoretical results for the proposed scheme
simulation results for conventional scheme in [17]
Figure 2 The secrecy outage probability versus the system average SNR. K = 3,M = 2, RS = 0.1 bit/s/Hz.
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Figure 3 The ergodic secrecy capacity of the system. (a) The secrecy capacity comparison between the proposed and the conventional scheme.
(b) The capacity loss relative to the system without eavesdroppers. K = 3,M = 2.
same as those for producing the results in Figures 2 and
3. From Figure 4, it can be seen that for various values
of M, the theoretical results exactly match the simulated
ones, indicating the correctness of the performance anal-
ysis in Section 4.2. In addition, the slopes of the curves
illustrate that the diversity order of M is achieved by
our protocol, which is in accordance with the analysis in
Section 4.3.
In Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8, the impact of some key
parameters on the system secrecy performance will be
examined. In these figures, we locate the K = 3 sources

























Figure 4 The intercept probability versus the
main-eavesdropper ratio (MER). K = 1;M = 2, 3, 4; SNR = 20 dB.
at
(








− 1√2 ,− 1√2
)
. The M = 2










. In Figures 5
and 6, the positions of the destination and the eavesdrop-
per are fixed as (2,0) and (2,2), respectively. In Figures 7
and 8, the destination is also located at (2,0), whereas
the eavesdropper’s position varies within the rectangular
region [−3, 3] × [−3, 3].
Figure 5 presents the curve of the system secrecy out-
age probability and exhibits how it varies with the target
secrecy rate RS. In this figure, five representative SNR


























SNR = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 dB
Figure 5 The secrecy outage probability versus the target
secrecy rate RS. K = 3,M = 2.
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SNR = 10 dB
SNR = 15 dB
SNR = 20 dB
SNR = 25 dB
SNR = 30 dB
Figure 6 The secrecy outage probability versus the power
allocation factor α. K = 3,M = 2, RS = 0.1 bit/s/Hz.
values are considered. As expected, when the target rate
increases, the SOP increases as well.
In Figure 6, the effect of the power allocation ratio on
the achievable SOP is investigated. Specifically, given the
total transmit power Ptot, we allocate αPtot to the selected
source, and (1− α)Ptot to the selected relay. As α changes
from 0 to 1, the SOP as a function of α is shown in Figure 6.
Here, we plot a set of SOP curves, each corresponding
to a specific SNR value. It should be pointed out that in
Figure 6, the notation ‘SNR’ represents the ratio of the
total transmit power for two phases versus N0, which is
different from the previous figures. An important obser-
vation from Figure 6 is that in order to optimize the system
performance, α should be neither too large nor too small.





























Figure 7 The intercept probability versus the location of the
eavesdropper. K = 3,M = 2, SNR = 20 dB. The numbers on the
































Figure 8 The secrecy outage probability versus the locations of
the eavesdropper. K = 3,M = 2, SNR = 20 dB.
large, the relay-destination link will be in poor channel
quality, which significantly limits the achievable rate at the
destination. On the other hand, if α is too small, imply-
ing that more power is allocated to the relay node, the
eavesdropper will benefit from the improved quality of the
relaying channel, which also decreases the secrecy rate.
From Figure 6, we can also find that the system perfor-
mance is satisfactory for α = 0.5. Therefore, the equal
power allocation scheme, which is assumed in our work,
is near-optimal despite its simplicity.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the eaves-
dropper’s location and the intercept probability. From
this figure, we can observe that the intercept probabil-
ity increases significantly when the eavesdropper moves
towards the relay nodes. This is obvious because the closer
the eavesdropper to the relays, the better the channel
quality of the relay-eavesdropper link. Figure 8 presents
the secrecy outage probability versus the eavesdropper’s
location. As expected, the impact of the eavesdropper’s
location on the SOP is similar to that on the intercept
probability.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a joint source-relay selection scheme is
proposed for vehicular networks under eavesdropping
attacks. The proposed scheme maximizes the instanta-
neous secrecy rate of the system and, hence, can minimize
the achievable secrecy outage probability. We present
the selection criterion and also give a low-complexity
method to realize this criterion in a distributed man-
ner. The system performance is analyzed in terms of the
secrecy outage probability, the intercept probability, and
the achievable diversity order. Finally, the effectiveness of
the proposed scheme and the correctness of the theoreti-
cal analysis are verified through extensive simulations.
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There are several interesting issues worthy of further
investigations. For example, in this work, we assume that
the channel gains regarding the eavesdropper’s link is
available, which may not be realistic for some scenarios
where the eavesdroppers are passive entities. Besides that,
it will be of practical significance to generalize the pro-
posed work to the systems with multiple eavesdroppers
and (or) multiple destinations.
Endnote
aFor the multi-source multi-relay network without
eavesdroppers, the best source-relay pair is selected
according to the method in [17].
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